A variant of realizability for Heyting arithmetic which validates Church's thesis with uniqueness condition, but not the general form of Church's thesis, was introduced by V. Lifschitz in [15] . A Lifschitz counterpart to Kleene's realizability for functions (in Baire space) was developed by van Oosten [19] . In that paper he also extended Lifschitz' realizability to second order arithmetic. The objective here is to extend it to full intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, IZF. The machinery would also work for extensions of IZF with large set axioms. In addition to separating Church's thesis with uniqueness condition from its general form in intuitionistic set theory, we also obtain several interesting corollaries. The interpretation repudiates a weak form of countable choice, AC ω,ω , asserting that a countable family of inhabited sets of natural numbers has a choice function. AC ω,ω is validated by ordinary Kleene realizability and is of course provable in ZF. On the other hand, a pivotal consequence of AC ω,ω , namely that the sets of Cauchy reals and Dedekind reals are isomorphic, remains valid in this interpretation.
Introduction
In the constructive context, Church's thesis refers to the viewpoint that quantifier combinations ∀x∃y can be replaced by recursive functions getting y from x. Dragalin [8] pointed out that there are two formal versions of Church's thesis one could consider adding to Heyting arithmetic HA:
Then for all x, D (F (x),1) = ∅. As a result, if (2) held, g • (F (x), 1) ∈ D (F (x),1) and g would provide a recursive separation of W f and W h . P If, on the other hand, we know that D e is a singleton, then we try to compute ( 1 e) • 0, ( 1 e) • 1, . . . , ( 1 e) • ( 2 e) simultaneously and as soon as the ( 2 e) − 1 many (guaranteed) successes have been recorded we know that the remaining one failure is the unique element of D e .
Realizability for set theories
Realizability semantics for intuitionistic theories were first proposed by Kleene in 1945 [12] . Inspired by Kreisel's and Troelstra's [14] definition of realizability for higher order Heyting arithmetic, realizability was first applied to systems of set theory by Myhill [18] and Friedman [9] . More recently, realizability models of set theory were investigated by Beeson [3, 5] (for non-extensional set theories) and McCarty [16, 17] (directly for extensional set theories). Rathjen [22] adapted realizability to the context of constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, CZF, and developed hybrids [23, 24] which combine realizability for extensional set theory with truth in order to prove metamathematical properties of intuitionistic set theories such as the disjunction and the numerical existence property. The authors of the present paper had problems making up their mind as to whether to present IZF as a pure system of set theory or to opt for a language with urelements as it is done in Friedman's and Beeson's work (cf. [10, 5] ). Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage of pure set theory is that the natural numbers have to be encoded as finite ordinals, rendering the presentation of the basic parts of Lifschitz' realizability for atomic formulas, which are trivial in the arithmetic context, very cumbersome. The disadvantage of having a sorted language with numbers and sets is that realizability for those theories has never been worked out properly in the extensional cases. In the end we went for the latter choice.
IZF with urelements
We will formalize IZF in a similar manner as in [5, chap.viii] by having two unary predicates for natural numbers and for sets. We shall however eschew terms other than variables and constants by avoiding symbols for primitive recursive functions. Instead we will have symbols for primitive recursive relations. This makes the axiomatization of the arithmetic part a bit awkward (albeit still a straightforward affair) but relieves us from the burden of having to deal with complex terms in the realizability interpretation.
Logic and language
IZF is based on first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus with equality =. The language consists of the following. A binary predicate ∈; unary predicates N and S (for numbers and sets); for each natural number n a constantn (but we omit the bar when n = 0); a 2-place relation symbol SUC (for the successor relation), two 3-place relation symbols ADD, MULT (for the graphs of addition and multiplication), and further relation symbols for all primitive recursive relations.
To alleviate the burden of syntax we shall use variables n, m, k, l, i, j to range over natural numbers, so ∃n . . . and ∀n . . . will be abbreviations for ∃x(N(x) ∧ . . .) and ∀x(N(x) → . . .), respectively. ∃ !nA(n) is short for ∃n A(n) ∧ ∀n∀m[A(n) ∧ A(m) → n = m]. x / ∈ y stands for ¬(x ∈ y). x ⊆ y abbreviates ∀z(z ∈ x → z ∈ y). We use ∀x ∈ y . . . and ∃x ∈ y . . . for ∀x(x ∈ y → . . .) and ∃x(x ∈ y ∧ . . .), respectively. The theory IZF in [5] comes with the additional axiom ∀x[N(x) ∨ S(x)]. We could have adopted this axiom as well. The reason for not including it is that on the one hand this axioms does not make the theory stronger but on the other hand it would force us to define a more complicated realizability structure in which all objects carry a label which tells one whether it denotes a set or a number. This would have to be done in a hereditary way and would thus burden us with an extra layer of coding. A proof that IZF+∀x[N(x)∨S(x)] can be interpreted in IZF using hereditarily labelled sets is sketched in [5, VIII.1]. Moreover, the same techniques can also be used to interpret IZF in pure IZF without urelements, IZF 0 (cf. [5, VIII.1]). IZF 0 has only the binary predicate ∈ (no N, no S and no symbols for primitive recursive relations). In IZF we define the pure sets as those whose transitive closure contains only sets. Let Pure be the class of pure sets. To every formula A of IZF 0 we assign a formula A Pure of IZF which is obtained by relativizing all quantifiers to Pure. Then the exact relationship between the two theories is that IZF 0 A ⇔ IZF A Pure .
The realizability structure
In what follows we shall be arguing informally in a classical set theory with urelements where the urlements are the natural numbers (e.g. IZF plus classical logic). The unique set of natural numbers provided by the Infinity axiom will be denoted by N.
Definition: 2.1 Ordinals are transitive sets whose elements are transitive also. We use lower case Greek letters to range over ordinals. By recursion on α define
where P(x) denotes the power set of x.
Proof: (i) is immediate by (3) . For (iii) note that if x ∈ V set then x ∈ P(N × (V set β ∪ N)) for some β. So the claim follows from our rendering of the power set axiom which ensures that P(y) consists only of sets. (iv) follows from (iii).
(ii): If x ⊆ N × V(L) then, using strong collection and (i), there is an α such that
For a more detailed proof see [22, Lemma 3.5] . P
Defining Lifschitz realizability for set theory
We adopt the conventions and notations from Definition 1.1.
Definition: 3.1 Let a, a i , b ∈ V(L) and e ∈ N. Below R is a symbol for an n-ary primitive recursive relation. Recall that D e = {n ≤  2 e | ∀m¬T( 1 e, n, m)}. We define a relation e L B between naturals e and sentences of IZF with parameters from V(L). e • f L B will be an abbreviation for ∃k[e • f k ∧ k L B]. e L R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) iff a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ N ∧ R(a 1 , . . . , a n )
Notice that the definitions of e a ∈ b and e L a = b fall under the scope of definition by transfinite recursion.
Recursion-theoretic preliminaries
Before we can prove the soundness of Lifschitz' realizability for IZF we need to recall some recursion-theoretic facts, mainly Lemmata 1-5 from Lifschitz' paper [15] . Van Oosten has carried out a detailed analysis of these results by singling out the extra amount of classical logic one has to add to intuitionistic first-order arithmetic HA to prove them. 
Proof: This is similar to [15, Lemma 5] and [19, Lemma 2.6 ]. However, due to the vastly more complicated setting we are dealing with here, we provide a detailed proof. We use induction on the buildup of A.
If A( x) is of the form N(x i ), define χ A (e) := φ(e), where φ is from Lemma 4.3. To see that this works note that D e = ∅ and for all (∀d ∈ D e ) d L N(a i ) entails that N(a i ) and D e = {a i }, thus φ(e) = a i and φ(e) L N(a i ) follow by Lemma 4.3.
If
where un stems from Lemma 4.5. Note that un is a total recursive function. To see that this works assume that D e = ∅ and for all (∀d ∈ D e ) d L a i = a j . Now, either a i , a j ∈ N or a i and a j are both sets. In the former case we then have a i = a j and for any n ∈ N, n L a i = a j , so in particular un(e) L a i = a j . If both a i and a j are sets, then un(e) L a i = a j holds owing to Lemma 4.5 and the definition of realizability in this case.
Let A( x) be B( x) ∧ C( x) and χ B and χ C be already defined. Let  * 1 and  * 2 be indices for  1 and  2 , respectively. Consider the set D Φ( * 1 ,e) = { 1 n | n ∈ D e } with Φ as in is non-empty (since D e = ∅) and every of its elements realizes C( a), hence, by the inductive assumption, χ C (Φ(e, θ(m))) realizes C( a). Thus we may define χ A (e) := λm.χ C (Φ(e, θ(m))).
In all the remaining cases χ A (e) := un(e) will work owing to Lemma 4.5 and the definition of realizability in these cases. P
The next result shows that our definition of realizability for arithmetic formulae coincides with the one given by Lifschitz [15] .
Lemma: 4.7 For every formula A(u, x) there are partial recursive functions ψ 1 and ψ 2 such that provably in IZF we have for all e ∈ N and a ∈ V(L):
Proof: (i). Suppose e L ∀x[N(x) → A(x, a)]. Then D e = ∅ and for all d ∈ D e and n ∈ N, d • n L A(n, a). Thus, if we define f n such that f n • d d • n, we conclude with the aid of Lemma 4.4 that for all n ∈ N and h ∈ D Φ(e,fn) , h L A(n, a). Hence, by Lemma 4.6, (∀n ∈ N) χ A (Φ(e, f n )) L A(n, a). So we can define ψ 1 by letting ψ 1 (e) := λn.χ A (Φ(e, f n )).
(ii). Suppose ∀n e • n L A(n, a). Then e L N(x) → A(x, a) for all x ∈ V(L), hence sg(e) L ∀x[N(x) → A(x, a)], so ψ 2 (n) := sg(n) will work.
(iii). Suppose e L ∃x[N(x) ∧ A(x, a)]. Then D e = ∅ and for all d ∈ D e there exists c ∈ V(L) such that  1 d L N(c) and
The converse is obvious. P
The soundness theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic with equality
6. Moreover, for each formula A(v, u 1 , . . . , u r ) of IZF all of whose free variables are among v, u 1 , . . . , u r there exists i A ∈ N such that for all x, y, z 1 , . . . , z r ∈ V(L),
where z = z 1 , . . . , z r .
There is a recursive function such that ( (e•0))•f sg((f, e • 0)), and hence, by the foregoing,
, (e • 0)). As a result, sg(( (e • 0), (e • 0))) L a = a. By the recursion theorem there exists an e * such that e * • 0 sg(( (e * • 0), (e * • 0))).
By induction on α it therefore follows that e * • 0 L a = a holds for all a ∈ V set . So we may put i r := e * • 0. As i r L n = n (trivially) holds for all n ∈ N, too, we get i r L z = z for all z ∈ V(L).
(2): It is routine to check that
with Φ from Lemma 4.4.
(3) and (4): We prove these simultaneously. Let TC(a) denote the transitive closure of a. We employ (transfinite) induction on the ordering ¡ which is the transitive closure of the ordering ¡ 1 on ordered triples:
¡-induction follows from the usual ∈-induction.
Now suppose a, b, c ∈ V(L) and inductively assume that for all x, y, z ¡ a, b, c ,
Suppose
As u, v, c ¡ a, b, c we can employ (7) to conclude that
Using Lemmata 4.4 and 4.6 repeatedly we get
for appropriate partial recursive functions χ i . Similarly one distills a partial recursive function * * such that for f, u ∈ c, * * (e # , e, f ) :
As a result of (8) and (9) we have with
Next
As a, b, v ¡ a, b, c we can employ (6) to conclude
, we thus have  1 ( 4 (e # , e, d)), v ∈ c and  2 ( 4 (e # , e, d)) L a = v. Hence, by Lemma 4.4, Φ( 1 e, λd. 4 (e # , e, d)) L a ∈ c. So the upshot is that
Finally we use the recursion theorem to find an index e # such that
With i t := e # • 0 and i 0 := e # • 1 the above shows that (3) and (4) are satisfied.
From the latter we get that D  2 e = ∅ and for all d ∈ D  2 e there exists v such that
for appropriate partial recursive functions χ i . So we may put i 1 := λe. 7 (e).
(6). This is shown by a routine induction on the complexity of A, the non-trivial atomic cases being provided by (2)- (5) . P Corollary: 4.9 There is a total recursive function θ such that for all a ∈ V(L),
Proof:
Let
P Theorem: 4.10 Let D be a proof in intuitionistic predicate logic with equality of a formula A(u 1 , . . . , u r ) of IZF all of whose free variables are among u 1 , . . . , u r . Then there is e D ∈ N such that IZF proves e D L ∀u 1 . . . ∀u r A(u 1 , . . . , u r ).
Proof: We use a standard Hilbert-type systems for intuitionistic predicate logic. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation. The correctness of axioms and rules pertaining to the connectives ∧, ¬, → is exactly the same as for Kleene's realizability. We have also shown realizability of the equality axioms in Lemma 4.8. So it remains to address the axioms and rules for ∨, ∀, ∃.
Axioms for ∨:
. By Lemma 4.6 we can therefore conclude that
As a result, λe.χ E (Φ(e, λd.λf.λg.f(d, f, g))) L A ∨ B → E.
Axioms and Rules for ∀:
If e L ∀xA(x, a), then D e = ∅ and (∀b ∈ V(L))(∀d ∈ D e ) d L A(b, a), and hence, by
for all b, a ∈ V(L).
We also have the rule: from
for all a ∈ V(L).
Axioms and Rules for ∃:
If e L A(a) then sg(e) L ∃xA(x), thus λe.sg(e) L A(a) → ∃xA(x) for all a ∈ V(L).
Finally we have the rule: from
Suppose e L ∃xA(x, a). Then D e = ∅ and for all d ∈ D e exists c ∈ V(L) such that d L A(c, a). Consequently, (∀d ∈ D e ) g • d L B( a). By Lemma 4.4 we then have D Φ(e,g) = ∅ and (∀g ∈ D Φ(e,g) ) g L B( a). Using Lemma 4.6 we arrive at χ B (Φ(e, g)) L B( a); whence λe.χ B (Φ(e, g)) L ∃xA(x, a) → B( a). P Lemma: 4.11 For every formula A(u, x) there are partial recursive functions Υ 1 , Υ 2 , and Υ 3 (depending solely on the formula) such that provably in IZF we have for all e ∈ N and b, a ∈ V(L): 
, and furthermore with the help of Lemma 4.8 (6) ,
, and thus by Lemma 4.6, 
Clearly, b * ∈ V set α . With θ from Corollary 4.9 we have:
where the fifth and seventh arrow are justified by Lemma 4.4 and the last arrow follows by Lemma 4.6 with A ≡ x 1 ∈ x 2 . Conversely, we have Proof: We treat the axioms one after the other.
(Arithmetic axioms): There are several and they are very boring to validate. In view of Lemma 4.7 it's also obvious how to realize them. We do one case study. 0 L SUC(n, n+1) holds for all n ∈ N. Hence (n + 1, 0) L N(n + 1) ∧ SUC(n, n + 1), thus sg((n + 1, 0)) L ∃k SUC(n, k), so ∀n e * • n L ∃k SUC(n, k) with e * is chosen such that e * • n = sg((n + 1, 0)). By Lemma 4.7 we then have
Now suppose e L SUC(c, a) ∧ SUC(c, b). Then c, a, b ∈ N and c + 1 = a = b, thus 0 L a = b and hence
From (13) and (14) we obtain a realizer for the first number-theoretic axiom.
(Induction on N): Suppose
. Thus for all h ∈ D un( 2 e) (with un from Lemma 4.5) and all x, y ∈ V(L) we have
Clearly,  1 e L A(0). Now suppose n ∈ N and SUC(n, m) and we have an index e * such that (∀h ∈ D un( 2 e) ) e * • (h, n) L A(n). We suppressed m in l # since m is computable from n (m = n + 1). Now choose e * by the recursion theorem in such a way that e * • (h, 0) =  1 e and e * • (h, k + 1) l # (e * , k, h).
If we inductively assume that e * • (h, n) ↓ for all h ∈ D un(e) then the foregoing showed that 
Fix d ∈ D e and x∈V(L) such that
Letting q(f, d) := i 1 • ( 2 f,  2 d) with i 1 from Lemma 4.8 we get
and hence
Since ( 1 f,  1 (q(f, d) )), v ∈ Un(u), we arrive at
where l(f, d) := sg((( 1 f,  1 (q(f, d) )),  2 (q(f, d)))). As a result,
where A is the formula x 0 ∈ x 1 . Since the latter holds for all d ∈ D e we get
The upshot is that sg((0, sg(λe.χ A (Φ(e, λd.χ A (Φ( 1 d, λf.l(f, d)))))))) realizes ∃w[S(w) ∧ ∀z(∃x(x ∈ u ∧ z ∈ x) → z ∈ w)] from which one gets a realizer for the union axiom via realizers for the separation axioms. Note that  1 d, n ∈ M and  2 d L z = n with n ∈ N entail that  1 d = z = n. We then also (trivially) have  
Thus sg(λf.sg(( 1 (sub( 2 f )), sub( 2 f )))) L ∀x(S(x) ∧ x ⊆ a → x ∈ V α ) and consequently
Let a ∈ V(L). Suppose there is an index e * such that for all f , b ∈ a and d ∈ Dē we have e * • d ↓ and e *
Using Lemma 4.8, we can explicitly engineer an indexî A such that for all d ∈ Dē and d ∈ D f we haveî 
As a consequence we have
Consequently, in view of (16), (∀d ∈ Dē) d • l * (e * , d) ↓ and
With the help of the recursion theorem we can explicitly cook up an index e * such that 
Then b is a set by separation in the background universe, and also b ∈ V set . Assume e L u ∈ b. Then D e = ∅ and for every d ∈ D e there exists x such that
, θ(f ))) L u ∈ a with the help of Lemma 4.8 (4) . As g L A(x) we get p(d, g) := i A (( 2 d, g)) L A(u) from Lemma 4.8, where A is obtained from A by replacing parameters from V(L) with free variables. Thus, from the above we conclude that
We can write l(d) := (q(d, f ), p(d, g)) solely as a partial recursive function of d since f =  1 ( 1 d) ) and g =  2 ( 1 d) ). Thus (20) 
Conversely, assume e L u ∈ a ∧ A(u). Then  1 e L u ∈ a and  2 e L A(u). Thus, for all d ∈ D  1 e there exists x such that  1 d, x ∈ a and  2 d L u = x. Then, by Lemma 4.8,
Consequently, by Lemma 4.4,
Hence e * * := sg(λe.χ C (Φ( 1 e, λd.l 2 (d, e))))
Finally, by (22) and (23), we arrive at (18) with e := sg((0, (e * , e * * ))). → ∃y B(u, y) ).
(Collection): Suppose
Then D e = ∅ and → ∃y B(u, y) ). y) . Therefore, using Collection in the background universe, there exists a set C ⊆ V(L) such that
C * is a set by Separation. Also C * ∈ V set . Now assume that d ∈ D e and e L u ∈ a. Then, for all d ∈ D e there exists x such that  1 d , x ∈ a and  2 d L u = x. Moreover, by (25) , d, d , h) ))) L ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y)), l 6 (d, e ) := χ E (Φ(e , λd .l 5 (d, d ))) L ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y)).
As we established (29) under the assumption e L u ∈ a, we get λe .l 6 (d, e ) L u ∈ a → ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y) ).
Thus, by Lemmata 4.4 and 4.6, we have l 7 (e) := χ F (Φ(e, λd.λe .l 6 (d, e ))) L u ∈ a → ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y)) (30)
for an appropriate formula F . Finally, by repeatedly applying Lemma 4.2, we see that sg(l 7 (e)) L ∀u[u ∈ a → ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y))] sg((0, sg(l 7 (e)))) L ∃z(S(z) ∧ ∀u[u ∈ a → ∃y(y ∈ z ∧ B(u, y))]) λe.sg((0, sg(l 7 (e)))) L ∀u[u ∈ a → ∃y B(u, y)] → ∃z(S(z) ∧ ∀u[u ∈ a → ∃y(y ∈ C * ∧ B(u, y))]).
P
Since BΣ 0 2 -MP is Lifschitz realizable by [19, Lemma 3.2] and MP pr is also Lifschitz realizable as will be shown in Lemma 6.5, it follows that the soundness theorem 5.2 can be extended to IZF . Theorem: 5.3 For every axiom A of IZF , one can effectively construct an index e such that IZF (ē L A).
The first large set axiom proposed in the context of constructive set theory was the Regular Extension Axiom, REA, which Aczel introduced to accommodate inductive definitions in CZF (cf. [2] ).
In particular, if R : a → A is a function, then the image of R is an element of A.
The Regular Extension Axiom, REA, is as follows: Every set is a subset of a regular set.
A set I is said to be inaccessible if I is a transitive set such that the following are satisfied: We will write inac(I) to convey that I is an inaccessible set, and Inac for the statement ∀x ∃I [x ∈ I ∧ inac(I)].
Theorem: 5.5 One can add large set axioms to IZF such as axioms asserting the existence of regular sets, inaccessible sets, Mahlo sets and other large sets. Such largeness notions have been considered in [21] and [2] . It would then turn out that these axioms are validated in V(L), too, if they hold in the background universe. We shall be content with stating one of these examples rigorously:
IZF + Inac proves that V(L) |= Inac.
Proof: We will demonstrate the latter result. So our background theory will be IZF + Inac. The proof is a modification of [22, Theorem 6.2]. Let a ∈ V(L). By Inac there exists an inaccessible set I such that a ∈ I. Let
A is a set by separation, and since A ⊆ V(L), C is a set belonging to V(L). Let κ := {x ∈ A | x is an ordinal}. One easily verifies that A = V set κ ∪ N. I being inaccessible it is clear from Theorem 5.2 that A realizes all theorems of IZF. In the main, we have to go through the proof of Theorem 5.2 to ascertain that the witnesses for set existence axioms of IZF can be found in C. We shall do a few examples.
For Pair suppose that 0, u , 0, v ∈ C. Put a := 0, { 0, u , 0, u } . Then a ∈ C since { 0, u , 0, u } ∈ A. As θ(0) L u ∈ a, θ(0) L v ∈ a, and θ(0) L a ∈ C we have (θ(0), (0, (θ(0), θ(0)))) L a ∈ C ∧ (S(a) ∧ u ∈ a ∧ v ∈ a). Thus q L ∃y ∈ C[S(y) ∧ u ∈ y ∧ v ∈ y], where q := sg((θ(0), (0, (θ(0), θ(0))))). Hence using 4.11(ii) twice we arrive at
(Union): For each 0, u ∈ C, put
Then Un(u) ∈ V set ∩ A and thus 0, Un(u) ∈ C. By the same proof as in Theorem 5.2 we find a realizer s such that s L ∀z(∃x(x ∈ u ∧ z ∈ x) → z ∈ Un(u)). Hence by 
Then V α ∈ A and hence 0, V α ∈ C. Then proceed as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.
The remaining axioms are also dealt with by similar adaptations of the proof of Theorem 5.2. So the upshot is that we find r (not depending on a) such that r L inac(C), and therefore also a realizer for Inac. P 6 Church's thesis in V(L) Lemma: 6.1 (IZF ) V(L) |= CT 0 !.
Proof: Note that according to Lemma 4.7 our realizability for arithmetic formulae is the same as in [15] . As a result, the same proof as in [15, Lemma 3] will do. Proof: The proof is the same as in [15, section 4] . First one shows that V(L) |= ∀n∃k C(n, k). Next one shows that from e * L ∃d∀n C(n, d • n) one would be able to engineer a recursive separation of X and Y above, which is impossible. P
The foregoing Lemmata also show that a "binary" version of number choice is not provable in IZF. Let AC ω,2 be the statement that whenever (A i ) i∈N is family of inhabited sets A i with A i ⊆ {0, 1}, then there exists a function F :
Corollary: 6.3 V(L) |= AC ω,2 . In particular, IZF does not prove AC ω,2 .
Proof: We argue in V(L). We have ∀n∃k C(n, k) with C as in the proof of Lemma 6.2. Then with A n := {k ∈ {0, 1} | C(n, k)}, A n ⊆ {0, 1} and A n is inhabited. Thus if AC ω,2 were to hold in V(L) we would get a function F : N → n∈N A n such that ∀n F (n) ∈ A n . Since ∀n∃!kF (n) = k, CT 0 ! implies the existence of an index d such that ∀n F (n) = d • n, and hence ∃d∀n C(n, d • n). This contradicts Lemma 6.2. P
The presentation axiom, PAx, was considered by Aczel [1] and Blass [6] . In category theory it is also known as the existence of enough projective sets. More details about PAx can be found in [2] . Since PAx implies countable choice we can infer the following result:
Corollary: 6.4 V(L) does not model the presentation axiom.
Recall MP pr from Definition 4.1.
Lemma: 6.5 (IZF ) V(L) |= MP pr .
Proof: Assume e L ¬¬∃n A(n) where A(n) is of the form R(n, k ) with R primitive recursive and k ∈ N. Then ¬¬∃f f L ∃n A(n), and thus by Lemma 4.7, ¬¬∃f L A( 1 f ), thus ¬¬∃f A( 1 f ). Using MP pr in the background universe we have ∃n A(n). Then, with r := µn.A(n), we have sg((r, 0)) L ∃n A(n). Whence λe.sg((r, 0)) realizes this instance of MP pr . P 7 More classical and non-classical principles that hold in V(L)
The next definitions lists several interesting principles that are validated in V(L).
Definition: 7.1 1. UP, the Uniformity Principle, is expressed by the schema:
2. Unzerlegbarkeit, UZ, is the schema
for all formulas A, B.
Then D e = ∅. Since 0 L S(a) holds for all a ∈ V set , we have
and so via UP, and hence ∀x(S(x) → A(x)) ∨ ∀x(S(x) → B(x)). Thus UZ is a consequence of UP. Therefore V(L) |= UZ. P A classically valid principle considered in connection with intuitionistic theories is the Principle of Independence of Premisses, IP, which is expressed by the schema
where A has to be assumed to be a closed formula. Proof: (1) . Assume e L ¬¬∃n A(n) where A(n) is of the form R(n, k) with R primitive recursive and k ∈ N. Then ¬¬∃f f L ∃n A(n), and thus by Lemma 4.7, ¬¬∃f L A( 1 f ), thus ¬¬∃f A( 1 f ). Using MP pr in the background universe we have ∃n A(n). Then, with r := µn.A(n), we have sg((r, 0)) L ∃n A(n). Whence λe.sg((r, 0)) realizes this instance of MP pr .
(2). Assume that e L ¬A → ∃x B(x). Then, if g L ¬A, 0 L ¬A and e • 0 L ∃x B(x). Therefore, D e•0 = ∅ and for all d ∈ D e•0 there is an a ∈ V(L) such that d L B(a), and therefore λu.d L ¬A → B(a). Hence, if A is not realized,
On the other hand, should A be realized, then ¬A is never realized, so λu.u would realize this instance of IP. P 8 The reals in V(L) By Lemma 6.1 the Cauchy reals in V(L) are the recursive reals. A well-known consequence of AC ω,2 is that the sets of Cauchy reals and Dedekind reals are isomorphic. As it turns out, the notions of Cauchy real and Dedekind real coincide in V(L) despite the failure of AC ω,2 .
Definition: 8.1 A Dedekind cut is a pair (L, U ) of subsets of Q, satisfying:
Call (L, U ) a strong real if there exists f :
Van Oosten showed that in the so-called Lifschitz topos [20, IV. Proposition 2.5] the two notions of reals agree. 
We will assume that the rationals are coded as natural numbers, more specifically we will assume that the property of being a rational number, the ordering between rationals and their distance relation are primitive recursive. From e we have to construct (an index of) a recursive function f : Q 2 → N such that (31) holds. From e we can compute an indexẽ such that
Now, given p, q ∈ Q with p < q we can compute a natural number n 0 such that 2 −n 0 < q−p 2 . In view of the above we then either have
and thus V(L) |= p ∈ L, or else there exists d 0 ∈ Dẽ •n 0 such that  1 d 0 < p. Let us assume that the latter case obtains. Pick h 0 ∈ D  2 ( 2 d 0 ) . Let d ∈ Dẽ •n 0 and h ∈ D  2 ( 2 d) . We then have
and hence V(L) |= q ∈ U . As a result we have
We are now lucky since the sentences in (33) and (34) are Σ 0 1 and at least one of them must be true. So we can define a recursive function f by simultaneously searching for a witness for (33) and for (34). If we find a witness for (33) before we find one for (34), let f (p, q) = 0, and if it is the other way round let f (p, q) = 1. P Of course, in the proof of the previous Theorem we used a certain amount of classical logic beyond that available in IZF . But we leave it to the reader to spell out the details.
The lesser limited principle of omniscience
Recall the following two principles under the names given to them by Bishop:
Definition: 9.1 The limited principle of omniscience, LPO: If f : N → {0, 1}, then either there exists n ∈ N such that f (n) = 1, or else f (n) = 0 for each n ∈ N.
The lesser limited principle of omniscience, LLPO: If f : N → {0, 1} such f (n) = 1 holds for at most one n, then either f (2n) = 0 for each n ∈ N, or else f (2n + 1) = 0 for each n ∈ N.
LPO is incompatible with CT 0 ! (see Corollary 9.3). Albeit being incompatible with CT 0 and thus invalidated in the usual Kleene-type realizability models, LLPO turns out to be compatible with CT 0 !.
Proof: (i) First we use the fact that the principle Σ 0 1 -LLPO from [4] is Lifschitz realizable. This is the principle
where P, Q are primitive recursive and k, l are parameters from N. It was observed in [4, Theorem 3.14] that LLPO is Lifschitz realizable since it is a consequence of BΣ 0 2 -MP and the latter is Lifschitz realizable by [19, Lemma 3.2] . One sees that Σ 0 1 -LLPO is a consequence of BΣ 0 2 -MP and MP pr (Lemma 6.5) as follows, letting P (n) := P (n, k ) and Q (n) := Q(n, l ):
¬∃l ≤ 1 ∀n [(l = 0 ∧ ¬P (n)) ∨ (l = 1 ∧ ¬Q (n))] → ¬∀n ¬P (n) ∧ ∀n ¬Q (n) → ¬¬∃n P (n) ∧ ¬¬∃n Q (n) → ∃n P (n) ∧ ∃n Q (n) using MP pr in the last step. As a result, with the aid of BΣ 0 2 -MP we obtain ¬[∃n P (n) ∧ ∃n Q (n)] → ¬¬∃l ≤ 1 ∀n [(l = 0 ∧ ¬P (n)) ∨ (l = 1 ∧ ¬Q (n))] ¬[∃n P (n) ∧ ∃n Q (n)] → ∃l ≤ 1 ∀n [(l = 0 ∧ ¬P (n)) ∨ (l = 1 ∧ ¬Q (n))] ¬[∃n P (n) ∧ ∃n Q (n)] → ∀n ¬P (n) ∨ ∀n ¬Q (n).
Now assume that f : N → {0, 1} such f (n) = 1 holds for at most one n. Using CT 0 ! there exists an index e of a recursive function such that ∀n e • n = f (n). Let P (n, e) and Q(e, n) be the primitive recursive predicates defined by ∃l ≤ n ∃l ≤ n [T (e, 2l, l ) ∧ U (l ) = 1] and ∃l ≤ n ∃l ≤ n [T (e, 2l + 1, l ) ∧ U (l ) = 1], respectively, with T being Kleene's T -predicate and U the result extracting primitive recursive function. We then have ¬[∃n P (n, e) ∧ ∃n Q(n, e)]. In view of the above we conclude with the aid of BΣ 0 2 -MP that ∀n ¬P (n, e) ∨ ∀n ¬Q(n, e), whence ∀n f (2n) = 0 or ∀n f (2n + 1) = 0. We will thus reach the desired conclusion if we can show that BΣ 0 2 -MP is Lifschitz realizable. This follows from [19, Lemma 3.2] since instances of the latter scheme are BΣ 0 2 -negative formulas. (ii) Assume LPO. Let f e (n) be 1 if T (e, e, n) holds and 0 otherwise. With LPO we get ∀n f e (n) = 0 ∨ ∃n f e (n) = 1, whence e • e ↓ ∨ e • e ↑. Thus ∀e ∃!k [(k = 0 ∧ e • e ↓) ∨ (k = 1 ∧ e • e ↑)]. In the presence of CT 0 ! we would thus find a total recursive function ρ such that ∀e [(ρ(e) = 0 ∧ e • e ↓) ∨ (ρ(e) = 1 ∧ e • e ↑)]. So ρ would solve the halting problem. As the unsolvability of the halting problem can be demonstrated in HA it follows that LPO is not Lifschitz realizable. P Since V(L) |= LLPO it might be instructive to recall why LLPO and CT 0 are incompatible: Take two disjoint recursively inseparable r.e. sets W e and W d . For each n define a function g n as follows: g n (2k) = 1 if T (e, n, k) ∧ ∀k < k ¬T (e, n, k ) ∧ ∀k ≤ k ¬T (d, n, k ) holds and g n (2k) = 0 otherwise; g n (2k + 1) = 1 if T (d, n, k) ∧ ∀k < k ¬T (d, n, k ) ∧ ∀k ≤ k ¬T (e, n, k ) holds and g n (2k + 1) = 0 otherwise. Then, using Σ 0 1 -LLPO (a consequence of LLPO), we have ∀n [∀k g n (2k) = 0 ∨ ∀k g n (2k + 1) = 0].
Thus in the presence of CT 0 there would exist a recursive function such that ∀n [( (n) = 0 ∧ ∀k g n (2k) = 0) ∨ ( (n) = 1 ∧ ∀k g n (2k + 1) = 0)], Proof: The function in (35) exists with the help of LLPO and AC ω,2 , and is noncomputable. P On account of V(L) being a model LLPO, there are several well-known mathematical principle that also hold in V(L). Perhaps, the best known consequence of LLPO is the "weak" linearity of the reals, i.e., ∀x, y ∈ R(x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x). The latter can be proved with the help of LLPO for Cauchy reals with a modulus of continuity (cf. [25, 5.2.2] ) and (crucially) without appealing to any choice principles. Therefore it holds in V(L) for the Dedekind reals, too. In a paper by Ishihara [11] it is shown that the following are "constructively" equivalent: LLPO, König's lemma, the fan theorem, the Hahn-Banach Theorem and the minimum principle, i.e., every real valued uniformly continuous function on a compact metric space attains its minimum. However, the notion of constructivism in [11] assumes the axiom of countable choice (and perhaps dependent choices) as a basic principle. Indeed, neither König's lemma nor the (decidable) fan theorem (see [25, 4.7 .2] for a definition) hold in V(L) as follows from the incompatibility of both principles with CT!. For a proof of the latter fact just take Kleene's primitive recursive 01-tree from [13, Lemma 9.8] (alternatively consult [25, 4.7.6] ) which has arbitrarily long paths but has no infinite recursive path.
Corollary: 9.5 V(L) |= Decidable Fan Theorem.
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